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ABSTRACT 
We  compare different indexation schemes in terms of their  ability to facilitate 
forgiveness  and reduce the investment disincentives associated with the large LDC 
debt  overhang.  Indexing to an ertdogenous  variable  (e.g.,  a country's  output) 
has a negative moral  hazard  effect on investment, This problem does not  arise 
when payments are linked to  an  exogenous  variable such as commodity prices. 
Nonetheless, indexing payments  to output may be useful when debtors know 
more about their willingness  to invest than lenders. We also reach new conclusions 
about the desirability of default penalties under asymmetric information. 
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As the LDC debt crisis wears on, more and more observers doubt that the debts will 
ever be paid in full.  Since the loans began trading only two years ago on an established 
secondary  market, the average price of the debt has fallen  steadily  and substantially.1 
Some observers have argued that the banks should consider  explicitly forgiving a portion 
of the debt. Work by Jeffrey Sachs (1985, 1988) and Richard Portes (1987), among others, 
suggests  that partial forgiveness could conceivably make both debtors and creditors better 
off:  if the banks commit themselves to absorbing a smaller part of a country's output, the 
country will be more likely to pursue the types of investment-oriented  policies that lead 
to higher future levels of output, thereby increasing the total resources available to both 
parties.2 
Despite the apparent merit of this logic, there has not been much debt forgiveness to 
date.  It is easy to see why there might be problems in implementing  a program of debt 
relief.  Even  if some forgiveness was indeed  in the interest of lenders,  borrowers would 
want much more.  Just how much is enough, from the lender's point of view? The amount 
of relief needed to stimulate investment  in different countries will depend on a variety of 
factors,  some  of which may be known only to borrowers. For example, a borrowing country 
may have a better idea about the amount of austerity it can impose on its citizens without 
causing  serious disruptions. 
In negotiating over the amount  of forgiveness, borrowing countries will want to mis 
represent their private information  in order to win more generous  relief. To continue with 
the above example, once forgiveness is on the table, a country will want to claim that its 
citizens  are very resistant to further belt-tightening,  so that a great deal of relief will be 
needed to have a positive impact on investment.3 
'Ftom July 1985 to August 1987, the average  price across  8 major debtors fell by 31 percent. The decline in the value  of 
individual country debt  over this period was: Brazil (32 percent), Columbia  (0  percent), Argentina (28 percent),  Mexico (38 
percent), Peru (82 percent), Ecuador (38 percent), the Philippines  (11 percent), and Venezuela  (20 percent) 
°See aloo Paul Krugman (19871o)  for an explicit ,li,cussion  of  the con,litions  under which  forgiveness  will be Pareto improving. 
'In cliocomnajons of debt relief, bankers  repeaterily stress their  fear that forgiveness  applied to one  country will become the 
I In this paper, we argue that changing the structure of  LDC financing may help remove 
some of the harriers to forgiveness.  An indexation scheme that links  repayment  to a 
country's future output could help distinguish the appropriate amount of relief on a case- 
by-case basis.  Such indexation  would remove the need to rely on countries  truthfully 
revealing their private information.  Fix post, a country that produces  more is likely to have 
been the type better able to sacrifice for future growth; output serves as  an indicator of a 
country's private information.  Therefore,  this type of output indexation facilitates  relief. 
We are certainly not  the first to consider the use of contingent  debt as a means of 
tying a country's  obligations to its ability to pay.  Included among the many refinancing 
proposals that have emerged are debt-for-equity swaps,4 interest-rate caps and moratoria, 
as  well as a variety of plans that involve indexed  securities.  One appealing feature  of 
many of these schemes is that they tilt the repayment schedule toward the future, when 
countries are likely to have higher income.  Increasing current liquidity seems like a good 
idea given the 5.5 percent decline in GNP per capita and the 5 percent fall in investment 
as  a percent of GNP witnessed  by the largest debtors since the onset of the debt crises. 
However, unlike previous authors, we do not  focus on the use of contingent  obligations 
as a way of extending  the payment period, as this can be achieved with any instrument, 
including standard, noncontingent  bank loans.  Our concern lies instead with the incentive 
distortions created by the sheer presence of a large debt overhang, and with the ability of 
alternative indexation  plans to reduce these distortions. 
The indexed obligations envisaged in many reform plans can he divided into two basic 
categories.  The first are those in which payments are linked to an endogenous variable 
— that is, a variable wbicb is at least  partly under the control of the debtor country.  A 
otondard applied to the next. They advocate the adoption of a caxe.hy-caee  approach, altho,,gh there ix no conseneux  on how 
oo,ch an approach  might be otructotred.  See,  for example,  the commetto of William  Og'Ieni,i Martin Feldotein (1985). 
4Aithongh we diecueo eec,,ritie, which can he thoght of ao  "eq,ti,  we avoid ,eing  the word eqni  in tloie paper. We do 
thi, for two ceaoono.  Firet, we ore concerned  with oecnritiee indexed to oome oeaonre of a country'o total output, which aoe 
not equi' in the uxoaal  oenxe of a reeidual  claim on a opecific bnoinece within on LnC  (hut eve Slhanan Helpman (1557), who 
refero to  ouch oec,oritieo ax equi').  second, "debt-vqui' ewape' are widely  thought of ao a meone  by which co,mtrieo  can help 
alleviate their foreign  exchange conetrainto  (eec Rudiger  Dornho,och (19s7(  for a pereaoivv critique of thio view).  Our analyoio 
deco oot invootigate  thio kind of liquidity conotraint. 
2 leading  example  is Norman Bailey's (1983) proposal  to convert  debt into proportional 
claims on exports.  Other possible endogenous indices are the country's total output, or 
its trade balance.  The second category of indexation  plan links payments  to an exogenous 
variable, one out  of the debtor country's control. A natural choice of index here would be 
the price  of a country's principal  export commodity  or the growth rate of the industrialized 
countries. 
The  primary purpose of this paper is  to provide an analysis of the relative pros and cons 
of these two types  of indexation.  Some researchers have failed to recognize the importance 
of the distinction between the two. For example, both Donald Lessard (1987) and Helpman 
(1987) have argued that some sort of  output  indexation  might he beneficial as a risk- 
sharing, or hedging mechanism:  risk-averse countries could shift some of their exposure  to 
better diversified lenders.  While this may be true, it does not imply that output indexation 
is the best way to accomplish risk sharing 
— commodity-price  indexation may be better. 
Krugman (1987a) does make the distinction between the two types of indexing.  He 
concludes that commodity price indexation is preferable to linking payments to a variable 
that is under the debtor's control. The reason for this is the presence of moral hazard: if 
a debtor's payments  are increasing  in exports, it will have less incentive to generate such 
exports than in the absence of such an arrangement. 
Our analysis calls for a softening of Krugman's  conclusions,  We find that indexing 
to an endogenous variable such as output may be a sensible strategy under some circum- 
stances.  As the earlier discussion suggests, such output indexation will have a role to play 
when asymmetric information  about some factor  relevant to the financial contract is impor- 
tant. Output indexing  helps to resolve some  of the adverse selection (or misrepresentation) 
problems associated with this asymmetric  information,  in a way that commodity-price in- 
dexing cannot. Thus in spite of the moral hazard costs it entails, output indexing may be 
worthwhile. 
To oversimplify somewhat,  we find that the preferred form  of indexing will depend 
3 on the nature of  the uncertainty facing  the lender and borrower.  If the uncertainty is 
about a symmetrically-observable  variable  (future commodity prices, for instance)  then 
commodity-price  indexing will be better.  However, if there is uncertainty about certain 
attributes of the debtor country,  then there will be a gain from adding output-indexing 
features to the security.  The analysis therefore implies that schemes such as Bailey's may 
be valuable  in a world where it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy  of countries'  appeals 
for relief. 
An interesting byproduct  of our focus on asymmetric information  is that it leads 
to novel conclusions  about the desirability  of banks being able to penalize  delinquent 
borrowers.  The usual view is that increasing  the ability  to inflict penalties is ez-ante 
Pareto improving, as such penalties  make more credible a country's promise to repay, and 
hence facilitate lending and investment.5  But once a country has gotten into trouble, the 
potential to impose penalties can create harmful distortions.  Ex post, higher penalties do 
allow the bank to extract larger  payments from the country, but at the  cost of  exacerbating 
problems arising  from adverse  selection.  We show that when penalties  are higher, attempts 
by banks to extract more from debtors  lowers the average level of  investment  that debtors 
can  undertake. It should be noted that this negative feature of penalties does not exist 
under complete information,  in which case renegotiation  should always lead to an efficient 
level of  investment.6  When there is asymmetric  information,  however, our analysis suggests 
that there is an optimal level of penalties that balances their ex-ante benefits  against the 
si-post investment  inefficiencies they create. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows.  Section  2  describes a simple model 
designed to capture the investment disincentive effects of a debt overhang,  Section 3 then 
explores the ability  of several repayment  schemes to alleviate these disincentives under 
°thjs conventional  function of penalties in sovereign lending is stressed by 3o,sotlin Eaton, Mark Gersovit, and loseph 
Stiglitz (1980). SacS, (isso), however, points out that, Cx 5g(e,  penalties can be harmful to the extent that they  encourage  risk 
averse countries  to pursue unnecessarily  risky investment  projects. 
tSee Jeremy Bulow and Kenneth Eogolf (1907)  who stres, the importance of renegotiation ac a means of avoiding the 
imposition of economically  inefficient  penalties. 
4 symmetric information. In section  4, we consider how the conclusions from the symmetric 
information  case are altered once there is asymmetric information  about the borrower's 
willingness to invest.  Section 5 concludes. 
2.  The Model 
The model has three periods.  At date 0, the country  and the bank attempt to rene- 
gotiate the country's existing debt, which comes due at date 2.  At date I, the country 
allocates  its initial  endowment,  E, between consumption  and investment,  given the repay- 
ment schedule it will be facing.  Because there is no debt to service at date I, investment at 
this time is not  "liquidity constrained." Rather, as will become clear shortly, the presence 
of a debt overhang at date 2 can lead investment to be "incentive constrained."7 Finally, 
at date 2 output from the investment  project becomes available for consumption  and debt 
service. 
The country is assumed to have the following linear utility function over consumption 
at dates 1  and 2: 
(1) 
where /3  is the country's  discount factor, In what follows, we analyze optimal financing 
schemes under two alternative assumptions: 
1)  /3  is observable to both parties; and 
2) /3  is private information  of the country. 
The latter case is intended to capture the spirit  of the example in the introduction, 
where it was suggested that a borrowing country  will have a better idea about the amount 
of current austerity its citizens are willing to tolerate. 
We use a linear utility function to abstract away from the type of risk-sharing  concerns 
analyzed  by Lessard (1987) and Helpman  (1987).  This is not  to imply that we think 
such concerns are unimportant. However, incorporating  them here would complicate  the 
Stu,rt Myers (1977) studies the investment disincexives creted by an overhang  of corpor.te debt. 
& analysis, without changing our basic conclusions. 
At date 1, the country  can invest an amount I, which yields 9 units of output at date 
2: 
Q=f(I),  (2) 
where f(I) is a concave increasing function. 
The total revenue from production,  X, depends on the "commodity  price,"  9 
X = 99 = 9f(I)  (3) 
We assume that 9 is unknown at date 0, hut is observed at date 1 by both the bank and the 
country.8  The variable  9 can represent any publicly-observable shock affecting the value 
of output. 
We begin the analysis by considering the case in which the country's debt obligation 
in period  2 is a fixed constant, D.  To keep things simple, we assume that the hank will be 
able to recover all of the country's revenue, up to the face amount of the debt, D. That 
is, the country's repayment at time 2, R, will be:9 
R = min(X, D) 
Now consider the country's investnìent  decision at date  1.  The country knows that 
it will not get to keep all the output from its investment,  and hence it may be reluctant 
to  invest.  (This is what was meant by the statement that investment  was  "incentive 
constrained.") Clearly, if the debt is so high that the repayment,  R, would equal the total 
value of output, X, the country would not invest  at all, and would instead consume its 
endowment at date 1. 
The complete resolution  of commodity  price uncertainty at date 1, before  the good io sold, may appear ,oncealiotic, oince 
there may be further  change  between dates I and 2.  llawever,  all that is  important far thi, model  is that there  he  sante 
information  revealed  about commodity  prices between  the time of renegotiation  and the inve,tment decision. For example,  we 
could make the random walk assumption  that date 2 price is A, +  A,, and that only A, is learned at date 1. 
°Models of  sovereign  lending  rest upon the assumption that the hank can impooe  a penalty on the co,mtry when it default,. 
For  now we aooume that if the country defaults,  the hank confiscates  all of the cosuitry's ot,tp,,t. Later we relax this assumption 
and  consider  a model  in which  the country can confiscate  up to a finite amount IC of the co,ntry's  output from the investment 
project. 
6 Investment becomes a possibility  only when the debt, D, is lower than the revenue 
that would be generated  by the investment,  so that R = D. In such a case, if the country 
does pursue  the investment  opportunity, it would choose the level of investment  so as to 
maximize: 
max  /3(91(I) 
— D) 
— I  + B.  (5) 
The first order conditions for this problem are: 
/39ff(J*) =  1.  (6) 
That is, if the country does invest, it will choose a level of investment,  1*, that is socially 
optimal.  However, it is not assured  that the debt payment  will be low  enough that the 
country  will want to invest at all. If the country does invest, its utility will be: 
U(I") = r3(ef (I") 
— D) 
— I" + B.  (7) 
If, on the other hand, the country consumes all its endowment at date 1, its utility 
will be E. Thus investment  will take place only if the debt payment is less than the critical 
level D", given by: 
= 91(1") 
— 1"/,3  (8) 
A simple comparative  static exercise establishes  the following  proposition: 
Proposition 1: D" is increasing in both 9 and /3 
The amount of debt overhang  that is compatible with the first-best level of  investment 
increases with both the commodity price (which just measures the marginal productivity 
of investment)  and the "patience"  of the country. 
3. Optimal Financing Arrangements under Symmetric Information about  /3 
Suppose  that /3 is common knowledge.  From  the bank's point  of view, what sort of 
financing scheme most efficiently resolves the investment-disincentive  problem associated 
with a large debt overhang? There are three possible  choices: 
7 1) Pure debt relief, in which the debt payment, D, is reduced from its  earlier level 
of D0, but is still fixed across states of the world; 
2) Commodity-price indexation, in which the payment is made contingent on the 
outcome of 8; or 
3) Output indexation, in which the payment is made contingent on the other ob- 
servable variable, X, the value of output. 
3.1. Pure Debt Relief 
Equation (8) tells us that if the initial level of debt, D0, is too high, the bank  may 
benefit from lowering it.  While lowering the level of debt reduces the amount the bank 
can recover in states where 8 is high (and the country would have been prepared to pay 
more) it increases  the probability  that 8 is high enough to induce investment. 
The optimal  level of debt relief is determined  by trading off these two considerations. 
Note,  however, that pure debt relief is a rather crude instrument: at the optimal level 
there will still be some states of the world for which the country finds it unattractive to 
invest. This results in an efficiency loss. 
3.2. Commodity-Price Indexation 
Under symmetric information,  a commodity-price-indexed  security can  be used  to 
maintain efficient investment  in every state of the world. The indexing  scheme is given by 
equation (8):  if the bank sets D(9) = Gf(V) 
— J*/f3, the country will always invest, and 
the bank will always recover the maximum amount that is compatible  with investment  by 
the country.10 
3.3. Output Jndexation 
Output indexation is another way in which debt payments could be  made to depend on 
tO In our model,  the outcome  under commodity.pricc  indexation can be replicated by a "muddling  through5 policy in which 
the country and  bank wait  until date 1 to determine the amount of debt relief.  In reality, however, there may be reasons to 
predetermine  the contract at date 0. Suppose  the country must make  a small initial outlay at date 0 to preserve  its investment 
project at date 1.  If the two  parties were to wait ,mtil date I to fix the ,lebt payment, the bank would  be  able to behave 
opportunistically and extract more surplus  from the country. Thus the opportunism associated  with a muddling.through policy 
leads to an ez-nte inefficiency the country is less willing to invest at date 0 
8 the realization  of 9, since the value of output, X =  OQ = 01(1). With output indexation, 
however, there is an  undesirable  side effect: if payments are increasing in X 
— and therefore 
increasing in I  — the country  will not want to choose the first-best  level of investment when 
it does invest. 
To see why this is so, think of the debt payment as a function of output: D = D(X). 
Consider the country's maximization  problem facing this payment schedule: 
max ,0(8f(I) 
— D(X)) 
— I + E.  (9) 
Assuming that D(X) is differentiable, the first-order  conditions for this problem are: 
/39f1(j**) =  + DF(X)Ofl(I**).  (10) 
If D'(X) is positive,  then equation  (10) implies that the level of investment  chosen 
under output indexation, I,  is less than the efficient level given by equation (6).  Hence 
under symmetric  information  about 3, output indexation is strictly inferior to commodity- 
price indexation,  which always achieves first-best levels of investment. 
4. The Role of Output  Indexation under Asymmetric Information 
In each of the three schemes considered in the previous section, countries that are less 
willing to invest  receive more  forgiveness.  This is a step  in the right direction. But in 
practice these plans have a serious shortcoming.  Once they are announced, each country 
will have an obvious incentive to understate its willingness to invest.  A  country would 
want to claim, for example, that current circumstances are already  poor and that a further 
decline in living standards cannot be tolerated.  As long as creditors are uncertain about 
the truthfulness of countries' claims,  a debtor will see in these plans an opportunity to 
procure more debt relief than it "deserves."  Banks are thus reluctant to propose  relief in 
the first place. 
In this section  we argue that although commodity-price indexation dominates  output 
indexation  in a world of symmetric  information,  output indexation can  be useful when 
9 there is asymmetric  information. In particular, we show that indexing  debt to output 
prevents countries from misrepresenting  their willingness to invest, and thereby facilitates 
debt restructuring. Countries  that wish to invest more place  higher value on future output, 
and are therefore more willing to pay for the right to produce more. Thus, by linking debt 
payments to output, more ipatiento countries  reveal themselves through their actions and 
are prevented  from getting  itoo much"  debt relief. 
To formalize this idea, we consider  a variation of the model in the foregoing section. 
We assume that the debtor country has private information  about the rate at which it 
discounts  future consumption.  To keep matters as simple as possible, we assume that the 
debtor's discount factor can take one of only two values, g > PL, where  = f3g with 
probability  p.11 
A contract in this setting specifies a payment at date 2 conditional on output, X.  We 
write this payment schedule as D(X).  The payment  can also he made contingent on 9, 
so that for each realization of 8 there is a unique D(X) schedule.  Since nothing is added 
to the analysis by conditioning  the contract on the mutually-observable  variable 8,  we 
simplify the notation by assuming that 8 is fixed (9 = 1) and write D = D(X). 
As in the previous section, the creditor makes a take-it-or-leave-it  contract offer which 
the country can accept or reject.  The country will accept if its utility is greater under the 
new contract than under the old one.  We assume for the moment  that if the country  were 
obliged to pay the entire debt overhang, D0, no investment  would take place.  (We drop 
this assumption later.)  Thus, the country will accept the offer as long as the contract 
provides for discounted consumption  greater than the country's endowment,  E. 
One way of determining the optimal contract is  to solve directly for the optimal 
payment schedule, D(X).  An alternative approach, developed in the incentives literature, 
reframes the problem as a direct revelation game.  In that game, the country reports its 
''The  model cn  bo extended in a mecbonical  fachion to allow for a continuous  distribution onfl, as in  an  ques  Lalfont 
and  Jean Tirole (1986).  Although certain comparative.statics  exercises  would he affected l  o,,r rimplification,  the result, and 
insights offered below ore not. 
10 private  information,  PH  or f3L•  If the country reports flj, it must produce output, X1, 
and pay an amount, D, i = H,L. Thus a contract specifies two pairs {Xg,Dff} and 
{XL,DL  } from which the country can choose. The Revelation Principle implies that the 
solution to this game will yield the same solution as the original game and is without loss 
of generality. Although  the revelation framework may seem artificial, it provides a simple 
and intuitive method for identifying the optimal  contract, In our model, X is a monotonic 
transformation  of I, so that we can equivalently write the payment  schedule as D(I), and 
the contracts as the pairs {Ig,DH} {IL,DL}.'2 
The bank's problem is to maximize its expected payments  subject to the constraints 
that  (i) the country reports its type truthfully (incentive compatibility); and (ii) each 
type of country accepts the contract only if it provides utility greater than E (individual 
rationality). The optimal contract, {I, b1}, that induces both types to sign the contract 
is the solution to the program, (P): 




— 'H ￿  PH(f(IL) 
— DL)  'L  (ICH) 
/3L(f(IL) 
— DL) 
— 'L ￿  /3L(f(IH) 
— DH)  — 'H  (ICL) 
— DH) 
— 'H ￿  0,  (IRH) 
13L(f(IL) 
— DL) 
— 'L ￿  0.  (IRL) 
The first two constraints are the incentive compatibility  constraints, which guarantee 
that neither country receives greater utility from revealing its true type than from pre- 
tending it is of the other type. The last two constraints ensure that each type of country 
prefers some investment  to consumption  of its entire endowment at date 0. 
the revelation  principle ccc l'artha Dacgcspt, Peter Hammond, and Eric Mackin (1979). For  more discussion  of the 
opplication  of their result,  to optimal contracts see David  Baron an4 Ro'r  Myvrson (1982). 
11 It follows from the results of the foregoing section that if there were complete infor- 
mation, the contract chosen by banks would involve 
D7=9f(I*)_I*/I31,  i=H,L.  (11) 
But note that if /3 were not observable and this scheme were adopted, a -type  country 
would always report that its discount factor is low, I3L Thus the optimal contract under 
symmetric information is no longer optimal  from the banks' point of view under asymmetric 
information. 
It turns out  that at an optimum only incentive constraint (ICH) and individual  ra- 
tionality constraint (IRL)  are binding.  (The intuition for this is provided below.)  The 
following proposition, which is the main focus of the paper, is verified in the Appendix.13 
Proposition 2:  If /3 is privately  observed  by the country,  the optimal contracts, 
{IL,bL}, {IH,bH} exhibit the following properties: 
(i) The /9H-type country chooses an efficient level of investment:  = I. The 13L- 
type country, however, underinvests  relative to what is efficient: 1L < I. Specifically, 1L 
satisfies 
/3Lf'(IL) = 
1  PPL/13H  > 1.  (12) 
(ii)  bL < D  and  L?g  < D:  both countries pay less  than in  the symmetric- 
information  case.  Given the chosen levels of investment,  1L  and Ig, the payments b 
and bH solve (ICH) and (IRL). 
If  13 is not observable, the optimal  symmetric-information  contract gives the fig-type 
country an incentive  to choose the contract intended  for the fir-type.  To provide  an 
incentive for the fig-type  country to reveal its type, the bank lowers b11 below D. In 
addition, the contract contains disincentives for a /3H-type to report I3L  A country that 
'5Thi,  proposition is similar to a number of results in the literature on contracting ,,nder asymmetric  information.  See,  for 
example, Sappington  (1983). His model shares a similar formal structure  although the exact interpretation differs 
12 reports  = 1k must choose 1L below I. The cost of this underinvestinent  is greater for 
a PH-type than for a -type since a PH-type places greater value on future output.  By 
making it differentially costly for a PH-type to underreport its discount  factor, the bank is 
able to extract a greater payment when the country truthfully reveals its type than when 
the country  always claims it is a /3k-type. 
4.1. The Nature of the Optimal Contract. 
In the contract given by Proposition 2,  countries  must  willingly choose to produce 
either XL or XH, and not  an intermediate  value.  To guarantee they  do this, the bank 
can specify a complete schedule of payments  for all possible levels of output, D(X).  The 
simplest such schedule is a step  function:  if X < XL, the country must  pay DL; and if 
X> XL  the country must pay DH. 
This type of step function is, of course, a direct result of our assumption that there 
are only two types of borrowers.  A more realistic assumption  might be that there are a 
continuum of types, 3 E  Then it is straightforward  to show that the D(X) schedule 
is a continuous,  increasing function.  The upwards slope of the D(X) function  leads all 
types to underiavest,  as was suggested  by equation  (10).  The degree of the distortion  is 
lower for the high-P types.  This can be seen in our two-type case, where, analogously, only 
the PL-type suffers distorted investment. 
4.2. Comparative Statics. 
The following comparative  static results, which we prove in Appendix,  are useful in 
the analysis below: 
Proposition 3: 
(i) An increase in PH lowers 'L and DL, and increases bH and 1H 
(ii) An increase in 1k increases 'L' bL, lowers DH, and has no effect on 'H- 
(iii)  An increase in p lowers 1L  and L, increases DH, and has no effect on 
13 The first two parts of the proposition characterize  the effect of making the two types of 
country more unlike each other. Under symmetric  information  a change in ,8 should have 
no effect on the investment  and debt relief of a f31-type country.  If the bank is uninformed 
about ,  however, a higher 9g implies less investment by the 13L-type country.  This follows 
because  the incentive to underreport  increases with  To induce the country to reveal 
its true preferences,  the lender forces the L-type country to give up more output at the 
margin. 
The last part of the proposition says that as the probability that the country  has a high 
discount factor increases, the investment  inefficiency imposed on a -type  country rises, 
while the payments  DH and DL rise and fall, respectively.  The intuition for these results 
is that banks' expected  profits depend increasingly on the size of the surplus extracted 
from the H-type country when p is higher.  In these circumstances,  the bank takes more 
of the surplus from the fIjj-type while raising the investment  disincentives for a -type. 
4.3. Comparison with Pure Debt Relief. 
The  ability  to index debt  to output  clearly  makes lenders  better off;  by revealed 
preference it dominates  pure debt relief. The question  we address in this section is whether 
society is better off under output indexation  or pure debt relief. 
Suppose first that the bank  cannot make debt relief contingent on output or invest- 
ment.  Since the country would  always claim that  it  is the more  impatient type, the 
amount of debt relief cannot depend on :  DH equals DL. If the bank sets the debt pay- 
ment low enough, both types of countries will invest. Conditional  on both types investing, 
it  will  offer the lowest possible debt relief, namely D.  Alternatively,  the bank might 
offer less debt relief, in which case the /IIL-type  country would not invest.  Conditional 
on only the /3H-type investing,  it will offer the minimum possible debt  relief, D. More 
generous debt relief is optimal provided D > pD or,  in terms of investment,  provided 
f(Ifl 
— I//3L > (f(I) 
— I//3H). 
By offering debt relief of D, the lender ensures that there will be an efficient level of 
14 investment  regardless  of the country's type.  Less generous relief reduces  the probability 
of investment, but increases the amount the lender receives when investment does occur. 
Such a policy, which we refer to as "stonewalling," may  raise the bank's expected profits 
but results in a gross inefficiency: a j31,-type  country undertakes no investment  at all.'4 
When stonewalling does not occur — that is, when debt relief is generous 
— the country 
undertakes  efficient investment,  regardless of its type.  Stonewalling  is more attractive to 
the bank, and hence the likclihood of an  inefficiency is greater, the greater is the probability 
that the country is the PH-type, the higher  is PH and the lower is PL. 
Now  suppose  that the lender  can index the debt to output.  Stonewalling will not 
arise:  the lender and the country always come to terms.  By providing a screening mecha- 
nism, output indexation loosens up the bargaining  process and facilitates investment.  By 
comparison,  pure debt relief is a blunt method because it does not allow the amount  of 
forgiveness to be conditioned on the country's type. 
Whenever stonewalling  would  occur under pure debt relief, the output-indexed  debt 
contract derived in Proposition  2 leads to a higher average level of  investment.  The  contract 
{ i,  Djj, I = H, L, induces the f3-type country to invest an amount greater than zero 
(albeit less than the optimum).  When stonewalling would not  occur, however, pure debt 
contracts lead to a higher average level of investment.  Under pure debt relief, both types 
of country will invest the efficient amount.  The following proposition summarizes  the 
intuition that stonewalling  becomes more attractive the greater are  p  and PH, and the 
lower is PL: 
PropoBition 4  For large enough p and PH, and low enough PL  stonewalling is 
optimal  if the bank is restricted to pure debt relief. In such cases, output-indexed  contracts 
would result in greater efficiency. In all other cases, pure debt relief is more efficient. 
'Stonewalling is analogous to a monopolist's  pricesetting  behavior, by rtting the price too high, the monopolist drives 
away Paretocfficiert trade  in an attempt to extract consumer  surplus from those who val,,e the good the most. 
15 4.4. Extensions: 
Bounded Debt Overhang. The above analysis assumes that the initial debt over- 
hang, D0, is so large that no investment  would take place in the absence of any debt relief: 
D0 > D > DL. This section relaxes this assumption.  We find that in general, lower ini- 
tial debt levels lessen tbe incentive for misrepresentation,  and hence lead to more efficient 
investment. 
In the case where D > D > D0, the /31-type country chooses efficient investment 
even without  debt relief. Indeed, in this case there is no scope for debt relief; total output 
is  maximized.  Any increase in the surplus the country retains is offset one-for-one by a 
loss in the surplus extracted by the bank. 
There are two intermediate  cases:  13 > a > D0 > DL and bjq > D0 > a > DL, 
where a is a cutoff point defined in the proposition below. Absent renegotiation,  in either 
case the -type country chooses efficient investment  while the -type does not  invest 
at all.  The optimal  contract therefore  solves the maximization  problem (F) except for a 
new individual rationality constraint for the -type country: 
PH(f(IH)-DH-IH ￿PH(f(1H)  -Do)-Ih.  (IRH') 
Let (F') be this new maximization  problem and let {I,D} denote its solution. 
An argument identical to that in the proof of Proposition  2 establishes that I  = I. 
That proof also established that the individual rationality constraint (IRH) is slack when 
D9 is infinite and reservation utility is E, Here, however, reservation utility is greater than 
E. Indeed, if the level of debt that solves the original program,  DH, is greater than D0, 
the solution to (P) will not  solve (F').  Instead, (IRH') will be binding and Dr = D0. 
What are the implication7 for efficiency?  Under  the new  constraint, the $-type 
receives more relief. Therefore  it is less attractive for a flu-type to misrepresent  its pref- 
erences.  When  D0 is greater than DL, but less than the cutoff point, a, both types of 
countries  invest efficiently. The bank sets  = IL because  the original debt burden is small 
16 enough that a 13H-type country  has no incentive to misrepresent its preferences, even when 
the /3.type invests efficiently.  That is, at low enough levels of debt, the (ICH) constraint 
is not binding.  When D0 is greater than the cutoff point a, (ICH) is binding.  Thus to 
induce truthtelling, I  must fall below I. Investment is no longer fully efficient. Finally, 
when the initial debt overhang  exceeds DH, we are in the base case analyzed above.  These 
results are summarized  in the following proposition and proved formally in the Appendix: 
Proposition 5: Let the cutoff point be a = f(I) 
—  — 
(fl'—  i—)I, which 
implies  that  DH  > a > D. The initial debt overhang,  D0,  must fall into one of  the 
following four cases: 
(i) If D0  [0, Dfl, there is no scope for renegotiation.  Both  types of countries choose 
efficient investment, Ij = I, i = L, H, and pay D0. In  this case the debt overhang is not 
a problem. 
(ii) If Do  E (D,a[, both types of country  choose efficient investment; the flL-type 
pays D and the I3Htype pays D0. 
(iii) If D0 e (a, DH[, the NH-type chooses efficient investment  and pays D0, and the 
L-type country underinvests, 'L <  < I. In this case, an increase  in D0 exacerbates 
the inefficiency (I falls). 
(iv) If D0 e (bH,co[, the  solution to (P') is the solution to (P). A change in D0 does 
not  affect the optimal contract. 
Bounded Penalties. The above analysis assumes that the lender is able to confiscate 
the country's entire output if the country defaults,  This section relaxes this assumption 
and assumes instead that there is a fixed finite penalty,  K, that the lender can impose on 
the country.'5 
Suppose first that K = 0. Then the lender cannot force any future repayment  and the 
oltrraotive  lormubtion,  whirh  ori,e, in iho model of Bulow and  Rogoif (1587).o that tho bank ran ronliocate  a frartion 
a < 1 of the rountry',  output. Up to thi, point, oil of our reoult, are ron,i,tent  with either the assumption that or =  1 or tho 
ao,umptioa that K  an, 
17 country will be able to consume all of its future output and undertake  efficient investment. 
That is, efficiency is maximized when the lender cannot penalize the country.  The optimal 
contract solves (P), with the additional constraint  that D ￿  K,  i = L, if. We then have 
the following proposition: 
Proposition 6:  If the bank can impose a fixed penalty, K, in the case of default, 
then Proposition  5 holds, with D0 replaced in every instance by K. 
The intuition for Proposition  6 corresponds exactly to that of Proposition  5.  In part 
(i), when penalties are very low, both types will choose efficient levels of investment.  In 
part  (ii), penalties  remain low enough that no investment  distortion is needed to induce 
truthteiling. The basic idea in (iii) is that the penalties are high enough to enable the bank 
to extract some surplus from the country, thus reducing the country's incentive to invest. 
If K < DH, the payment OH is not feasible, and therefore  the payment must be reduced 
to K. If K is lower, truthful revelation  becomes more attractive and hence the bank need 
not reduce 'L by as much to maintain incentive compatibility,  in part (iv), when penalties 
are very high, we have the case analyzed in (P). 
Our focus on asymmetric information  leads to different conclusions  about the de- 
sirability of penalties than the now-standard  approach  of  Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz 
(1986). These authors focus on ex-ate considerations and conclude that higher penalties 
are Pareto  improving: penalties  make countries' promises to repay more credible, and hence 
facilitate  lending.  But ex post, once the country  has borrowed and gotten into trouble, the 
ability to penalize can be harmful.  Banks can get more from the country, but it conies at 
the expense of foregone investment.  This is true regardless  of whether banks adopt index- 
ation or pure debt relief with stonewalling. But note that the inefficiency induced by large 
penalties is a problem only under asymmetric information.  Under complete information, 
18 renegotiation  always leads to efficient  investment.16 Our analysis suggests that in general 
there should be an optimal penalty cost that balances ez-ante borrowing incentives  and 
ex-post  investment  disincentives. 
16Se  Bulow md Rogoff (1587). 
19 5.  Conclusion 
In the presence of a large debt overhang,  various indexation schemes  may help to 
improve the investment  incentives of borrower  countries. Under symmetric information, 
contracts that make payments  contingent  on variables  that are out of the country's control 
create no disincentive effects, and lead to the first-best  level of investment.  On the other 
hand, contracts that make payments  contingent on a variable that is atleast partly under 
the country's control, such as exports or total output, leave scope for moral hazard prob- 
lems and so lead to inefficient investment.  When there is asymmetric  information  about 
some attribute of the country, however, output indexation  may facilitate relief and reduce 
(but  not entirely eliminate)  investment  disincentives. 
The same penalties  that make sovereign lending possible in the first  place, may  be 
harmful once the country has gotten into trouble.  When penalties are high,  the bank's 
gains in either the case of stonewalling or indexation come at the expense  of lowering the 
country's average level of investment. Ex post,  the presence of asymmetric  information 
about the country implies that higher  penalties  raise the welfare of the bank, but on 
average lower the welfare of both the country and possibly society as a whole. 
The simplicity of our approach  has its costs,  in that we neglect important aspects 
of the debt problem.  We abstract entirely from liquidity  issues.  Yet current, not future, 
debt-service  obligations  have recently been an important harrier to investment  in hUGs. 
Other authors, most notably Krugman (1985), have already stressed the fruitlessness  of 
squeezing too much too fast out of debtors.  While the liquidity squeeze of the lQSOs  has 
taken on obvious toll on current investment in LDGs, and, therefore, has already received 
considerable  attention, the more subtle incentive effects over time of a substantial debt 
overhang have been largely o'erlooked.  At the risk of oversimplification, we have tried 
to focus on the nature of these investment disincentives  and on how they relate to debt 
indexation and forgiveness. 
20 6. Appendix 
Proof of Propoeition 2: First suppose that constraints  (IRH) and (ICL) are slack. 
We will then show that these constraints are indeed satisfied at an optimum. 
Note that (IRL) must be binding at an optimum  otherwise DL could be increased still 
satisfying (IRL) while relaxing (ICH)  and increasing the objective function.  Furthermore, 
(ICH) must be binding  at an optimum, otherwise the objective function could be increased 
by raising Djj. 
Given that (IRL) and (ICH) are binding,  we can substitute them into the objective 
function.  The maximization  then becomes: 
max  P(f(IH) - 
'H/PH)  i - 
P)(f(IL)  IL/PL) - 
P'L(— - I).  'LIII  Pt  PH 
It is clear from the above problem that Ij is chosen efficiently and that 1, is as given 
in the equation of the Proposition.  Given It, Dt solves (IRL).  Because 1j < I,  it must 
be that fij  <  Di,.  Finally,  given that Ijj = I  and the right-hand side of (ICII) is 
positive,  D11 must be less than 
It remains  to verify that (IRH) and (ICL) are slack, Since the PH-type country  could 
have chosen the contract for the PL-type country,  but did not, then  the PH-type country 
must be receiving positive surplus from undertaking the investment project. 
The following argument establishes  that (ICL) is indeed slack at an optimum.  First, 
note that from (ICH) and the fact that 'H > 1, it follows that f(IH)—DH > f(It)—Dr. 
Given this, if PH  is reduced  to Pt it results in a greater impact on the left-hand  side than 
the right-hand side.  Since (ICH) is binding, it means that: 
—I + /3rAf(Iii) 
— DH) <1L + /3L(f('L) 
— DL), 
which is exactly the constraint (ICL).  This concludes the proof of Proposition  2. 
Proof of Proposition 3:  (i) Inspection of  (12) reveals that an increase in g  reduces 
I. Given this reduction, it follows from (IRL) that b  is lowered.  Since I  = I,  an 
21 ircrease in f3j-  increases 'H  Also since  1L  is reduced the right-hand side of (ICH) is 
reduced.  This combined with the increase  in 13H enables the bank to increase DR. 
(ii) From (12) and (IRL),  an increase in /3L  increases 'L and h1.  This increases 
the right-hand side of (ICH) and given that 'H =  is unaffected by 8L' DR must be 
reduced. 
(iii) From (12) and (IRL) an increase  in p decreases I  and bL. A similar argument 
as in (ii) establishes that DR is increased and there is no effect on 'H  This concludes the 
proof of Proposition  3. 
Proof of Proposition 5: The argument for part (i) of the proposition was stated in 
the text. 
The  optimization  problem  (F') maximizes expected payments  subject to  (ICH), 
(IRL), and the additional constraint  (IRH'). 
We first establish the conditions  under which first-best efficiency is attained  in this 
program. Suppose  only (IRH') and (IRL) are binding.  Then at an optimum, I = 
i  = H, L, D' = D  and from (IRH'), D' = D0.  It follows that if D0 < f(I) 
— I//3 
—  (_ 
—  = a,  the constraint (ICH) is slack.  This establishes  part  (ii) of the 
Proposition. 
If D0  > a the above contract is not  implementable  and (ICH) is binding.  It  is 
straightforward  to verify that  =  because maximizing net output relaxes both con- 
straint (ICH) and (IRH'). 
Now note that if D0 ￿  bH the solution to (P) is also a solution to (F') since (IRH') 
is then slack. This establishes part (iv) of the Proposition. 
The remaining case is where D0 > a but less than DH. In this case, it follows that 
= D0. In order to maintain incentive compatibility, I  must be reduced  below I. In 




22 wher  (IlL) was substituted into (ICH). It follow. that In this range,  is decreasing 
In D. This completes the —  of —  (Ill) of the Proposition. 
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